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COMPETITION POLICY, CAPACITY BUILDING, 
AND SELECTIVE ADAPTATION: LESSONS FROM 
JAPAN’S EXPERIENCE 
RICHARD SCHWINDT∗ 
DEVIN MCDANIELS∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past twenty years there has been a remarkable increase in the 
number of jurisdictions that have implemented comprehensive competition 
policies.1  
The enactment of competition legislation has become a global 
phenomenon. Competition law has, in effect, become the latest 
fashion. To be someone, it appears, everyone—including the 
members of the APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation] 
community—must have a competition statute. For some 
(particularly the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe as 
well as the Baltic states) the explanation lies in more than pure fad. 
To be someone means to be a member of the European “club” and 
true to the tradition of elite clubs everywhere. Proper dress—in this 
case competition legislation acceptable to those who run the club—
is one of the prerequisites of membership.2 
There are a number of factors, besides faddishness, that explain this 
recent proliferation of competition policy regimes. Developing countries 
with emerging market economies recognize the benefits that such policies 
can provide for the development process. Countries in transition from 
centrally planned to market economies see a role for competition policy, 
both as a mechanism to encourage the operation of efficient markets and 
as an antidote to entrenched, recently privatized dominant firms in specific 
industries. There has been encouragement (and sometimes pressure) from 
 
 
 ∗ Simon Fraser University.  
 ∗∗ University of British Columbia. The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the Asia–
Pacific Dispute Resolution Project. 
 1. The term “comprehensive” is used to indicate an explicit, unified set of rules intended to 
protect competition. Nearly all economies have long had rules, generally scattered among multiple 
pieces of legislation that reflected certain elements of competition policy.  
 2. John O. Haley, Competition Law for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Community: 
Designing Shoes for Many Sizes, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002). 
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trading partners and trade organizations for the adoption of rules that will 
curb anti-competitive structures and behaviors that impair international 
trade. The accession to free-trade groups, such as the European Union 
(EU), has required the establishment of competition policy. As a result, 
many jurisdictions with little competition policy experience and quite 
different motivations are striving (and sometimes struggling) to implement 
such policies. In response, jurisdictions with mature competition policy 
regimes have assisted in capacity building, both individually and 
collectively. 
The development of competition policy is largely based on North 
American, and, recently, Western European experiences. United States 
antitrust policy, with a century of development, is mature and, in the view 
of most commentators, comprehensive and largely consistent with modern 
economic thought. Despite this recognition, capacity builders helping to 
implement competition policies do not recommend that their clients 
simply adopt the American rules.3  
It stands to reason that competition policy systems will be influenced 
by the economic, institutional, legal, and cultural settings of the adopting 
jurisdiction. The question is how the system will be influenced. It is 
important that solutions to competition issues achieve the overarching goal 
of competition policy—the effective operation of markets. Capacity 
builders do not have a clear-cut understanding of how the mix of 
economic, legal, institutional, and cultural influences impinges on the 
implementation of an effective system. Indeed, they spend considerable 
effort trying to determine the best building tools as they choose between 
assistance in drafting rules, training the judiciary, training competition 
agency officers, and seconding their own experienced staff to work with 
newly established agencies.4 If there were a way to predict how specific 
policies would be adapted to local conditions, and which local conditions 
would be amicable or inimical to effective policy implementation, the job 
of capacity building would be much easier. 
 
 
 3. Russell W. Damtoft, Counsel for Int’l Technical Assistance, Bureau of Competition, U.S. 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Lessons Learned in the Delivery of Technical Assistance: The United States 
Experience, Address Before the International Competition Network Second Annual Conference 4 
(June 23, 2003), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/ 
conference_2nd_merida_2003/merida_speech6.pdf. 
 4. See, e.g., International Competition Network, Competition Policy Implementation Working 
Group, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/working-groups/ 
competition-policy-implementation (last visited July 6, 2007). 
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One potential tool to assist in this regard is Potter’s selective adaptation 
model.5 The model identifies the role of local conditions in the adaptation 
of foreign rules. It has been successfully applied to China’s adaptation of 
property law, administrative law, and corporate governance rules. The 
question we address is whether and how the model can be applied to the 
adaptation of competition policy. 
This Article reflects our first steps towards an answer. It involves an ex 
post descriptive analysis of the initiation and first fifty years of 
enforcement of anti-cartel and merger control rules in Japan. The analysis 
is conducted from the perspective of the selective adaptation model. We 
rely largely on secondary sources (and there is extensive, voluminous 
literature), and we acknowledge that we are neither Japanologists nor legal 
scholars. Nonetheless, we think the exercise provides some insight into 
how competition rules will likely be adapted in developing and transitional 
economies, and what the sponsors of capacity building should emphasize 
in pursuit of successful policy implementation. The current Secretary 
General of the Japanese competition policy authority, the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission, acknowledges that Japan’s mixed experience with 
competition policy can provide lessons for capacity builders.6 The purpose 
of this research is to identify those lessons. 
Therefore, unfortunately, it must be said that Japan had experienced 
too late as well as too small steps taken in the field of competition 
law.  
 However, this might mean that Japan can offer valuable lessons 
to many countries in the world that are going to start serious 
enforcement efforts of their competition laws from now on. After 
1990, many countries had adopted competition laws, but it seems to 
be very difficult for the enforcement agency of competition laws to 
establish itself in such a short period of around 10 years in view of 
the experiences of our country.7 
This Article begins by describing the selective adaptation model. It 
then identifies the core areas of competition policy and the basic elements 
 
 
 5. Pitman B. Potter, Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective Adaptation of 
Globalized Norms and Practices, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 119, 119–50 (2003). 
 6. Akinori Uesugi, Sec’y-Gen. of the JFTC, Enforcement of Competition Laws in Japan, 
Speech Before the International Competition Enforcement Conference 1 (Apr. 20–21, 2005) (updated 
transcript reflecting the amendment of the AML on Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/ 
e-page/policyupdates/speeches/050420uesugi.pdf. 
 7. Id. 
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of implementation (i.e., the rules, enforcement, and outcomes). 
Subsequent sections explore Japan’s experience with two of the core 
elements of competition policy (cartel and merger control) through the 
lens of selective adaptation.  
II. SELECTIVE ADAPTATION 
The basic premise of the selective adaptation model is straightforward: 
when a jurisdiction adopts an alien set of rules, it will not do so holus-
bolus. The rules, and more importantly the implementation of the rules, 
will be adapted to local conditions. The more challenging task is 
identifying and measuring the forces that influence the direction and extent 
of the adaptation. Why is it that one jurisdiction can take a set of rules 
“off-the-shelf,” clone the implementation procedures of established 
regimes, and achieve the desired policy goals; however, in other cases 
adaptation is extensive, painfully slow, and sometimes results in policy 
with unforeseen and undesirable consequences?  
The selective adaptation model sets out a number of factors that will 
condition the establishment and implementation of foreign norms as 
reflected in “rules, structures, processes and practices.”8 It starts by asking 
how much room the local jurisdiction has to adapt or modify the foreign 
norms.9 Then it asks which factors influence the level and direction of 
adaptation given binding constraints.10  
The room for adaptation depends first on the power relationship 
between the source of the foreign norms and the local jurisdiction.11 At 
one extreme there might be no power issue at all. For example, a local 
jurisdiction in transition from a centrally planned to a market economy 
might voluntarily adopt a purely Western-style competition policy with 
little modification to facilitate the transition, even though the policy is 
“foreign.” At the other extreme, a foreign jurisdiction might be in a 
position to force its norms on the local environment, as in the case of 
military occupation. The power of the source of the foreign norms can 
come through the “carrot or the stick.” The promise of sought-after 
membership in a customs union can provide a powerful enticement to 
 
 
 8. Potter, supra note 5, at 120.  
 9. Id. at 120–21. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  
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voluntarily adopt foreign regulatory norms;12 the threat of trade sanctions 
can provide an equally powerful incentive.13 
Once the binding constraints are set, the degree and direction of 
adaptation depends upon perception, legitimacy, and complementarity.14 
Local perceptions of the purpose (both declared and undeclared), content, 
and effects of foreign rules and regulatory norms impinge upon the 
implementation of such rules in the local context. If foreign and local 
perceptions are parallel, modification of the foreign norms will be more 
moderate when all things are equal.15 Legitimacy involves the extent to 
which the members of the local jurisdiction agree with the purpose and 
projected results of the foreign rules.16 Complementarity is defined as the 
extent to which foreign and local regulatory norms can be combined to 
achieve a desired outcome.17 In other words, if the foreign rule assists in 
achievement of a local priority, it is more likely to be accepted. 
Conversely, if the foreign rule is seen as impairing achievement of the 
local priority, it is more likely to be resisted (or adapted in a form that is 
non-recognizable).18  
III. COMPETITION POLICY 
Before applying the selective adaptation model to the Japanese 
experience with competition policy, it is necessary to identify which 
specific policies are to be considered and what elements (such as rules, 
enforcement, and outcomes) are emphasized. 
A. Core Areas of Competition Policy 
There is no universal agreement as to precisely what comprises 
competition policy. Some would include a broad set of policies that 
influence industrial structure, conduct, and performance, including direct 
regulation (and deregulation), privatization policies, foreign investment 
policies, and antitrust policies. Others point to antitrust policies alone. To 
 
 
 12. See, e.g., Potter, supra note 5; id. at 122–24 (describing the case of China’s ascension to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO)). 
 13. Seung Wha Chang, Interaction Between Trade and Competition: Why a Multilateral 
Approach for the United States, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 1–38 (2004). 
 14. Potter, supra note 5, at 120. 
 15. See id. at 120–21. 
 16. Id. at 121. 
 17. Id. at 120. 
 18. Id. at 120–21. 
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make the analysis tractable, we focus on two of the three core areas of 
antitrust policy: horizontal agreements and mergers.19  
Horizontal agreements are arrangements between direct competitors 
that constrain independent behavior.20 They include joint ventures, 
specialization agreements, joint research and development projects, joint 
advertising campaigns (or agreements to restrict advertising), some trade 
association activities (such as agreements to adhere to common standards 
or common terminology), purchasing groups, bid-rigging, and outright 
cartelization intended to restrict supply and raise prices.21 Jurisdictions 
with mature competition policy regimes almost always have strong, well-
enforced rules prohibiting naked cartelization such as bid rigging, price 
fixing, and market sharing.22 This is for two reasons. First, there is near-
universal agreement amongst economists that naked cartels result in 
inefficient outcomes.23 Second, the remedy for an offensive horizontal 
agreement is obvious—the parties must stop the offensive behavior.24 This 
combination of agreement over the deleterious effects of the behavior and 
an obvious, operational remedy has caused the control of cartels to be a 
primary concern of both established and emerging competition policy 
regimes. 
Horizontal mergers involve the amalgamation of competing 
businesses.25 By definition, the removal of a competitor from the market 
reduces competition; however, the end result might well have no impact 
on equilibrium prices or quantities. On the other hand, some mergers can 
create or substantially increase market power with likely harmful effects 
on prices and quantities.26 Compared to cartelization, there is much less 
consensus amongst economists on the social welfare impact of horizontal 
mergers between significant market participants. Nonetheless, in many 
 
 
 19. For the purposes of this Article, the third core (but less frequently enforced) set of antitrust 
rules dealing with “abuse of a dominant position” are ignored.  
 20. Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, (Harvard Law School Discussion Papers Series, No. 
575, reprinted in A. MITCHELL POLINSKY & STEVEN SHAVELL EDS., HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS) 51–52 (forthcoming 2007) 
 21. Id. 
 22. Jens Høj, Competition Law and Policy Indicators for the OECD Countries (OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 568) (2007). 
 23. Here and throughout this Article the notion of efficiency is meant to encompass allocative 
efficiency (i.e., production and consumption of the optimal quantity and mix of products and services), 
technical or productive efficiency (i.e., production of the optimal quantity and mix of products and 
services at the lowest resource cost), and dynamic efficiency (i.e., the optimal introduction over time 
of new products and processes). 
 24. Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 58–59. 
 25. Id. at 59. 
 26. Id. at 59–78. 
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mature competition policy jurisdictions, merger rules are well-developed 
and are actively enforced.27 This has much to do, once again, with the 
existence of an obvious, operational remedy. Parties to a proposed merger 
can simply be prohibited from proceeding.28 It is well recognized that anti-
competitive, extant market structures are often very difficult to correct.29 
High levels of concentration can lead to interdependence and a dampening 
of competition.30 But if market shares have been honestly won, it is 
difficult to alter the market structure.31 Dismemberment is strong medicine 
and is rarely prescribed. However, it is relatively easy for public policy to 
stop the accretion of market share through horizontal mergers. 
B. Elements of Policy 
In attempting to operationalize the application of the selective 
adaptation model to the implementation of these areas of competition 
policy, we will focus on two elements: the rules and the enforcement. 
Adaptation can begin with the actual drafting of the rules. For example, 
a current area of concern among competition policy practitioners, 
particularly in Canada, is the role of an efficiency defense in merger 
cases.32 On the surface, the issue is fairly simple. Should an 
anticompetitive merger be allowed if it generates substantial efficiencies? 
And if such a defense exists, how is the trade-off to be measured? Societal 
norms come into play in answering these questions. In a jurisdiction that 
puts great faith in the ability of markets to achieve efficiency without 
resorting to anticompetitive mergers, the rules might not allow for an 
efficiency defense. Where such a defense is allowed, the rules might 
stipulate how the trade-off is to be measured. (Is it to be total social 
surplus, consumer surplus, or some hybrid?) Again, norms will play a role. 
The United States adheres to a “price test.”33 If an anticompetitive merger 
results in cost savings so great that the post-merger price is expected to 
 
 
 27. See Høj, supra note 22. 
 28. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES, 7–8 
(2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf. 
 29. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 101–02 (2d ed. 2001). 
 30. Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 35–36. 
 31. Even in the case of monopoly, U.S. courts are reluctant to impose structural remedies such as 
dismemberment. The recent Microsoft legal action is a case in point. See David Evans, Albert Nichols 
& Richard Schmalensee, United States v. Microsoft: Did Consumers Win?, J. COMPET. L. & ECON. 
515 (2005).  
 32. Thomas W. Ross & Ralph A. Winter, The Efficiency Defense in Merger Law: Economic 
Foundations and Recent Canadian Developments, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 471–504 (2004) 
 33. Id. 
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fall, the merger may be allowed.34 Here the norm emphasizes consumer 
well-being at the expense of the producer. Currently Canadian 
jurisprudence is struggling with this trade-off as the legislation explicitly 
allows for an efficiency defense but does not provide much guidance on 
how it is to be measured.35 
Regardless of the substance of the rules that are adopted, the efficacy 
of the policy will depend upon its enforcement, which is obviously 
susceptible to adaptation. The composition, role, resources, and attitudes 
of the enforcement body will directly influence the way in which the rules 
are implemented.  
IV. THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE 
We now turn to a descriptive analysis of Japan’s implementation of 
competition policy. The story begins with a very brief sketch of the 
historical context.  
A. Introduction  
The business history of Japan leading up to the 1947 introduction of 
competition policy by the American occupying forces has been 
extensively documented.36 Nonetheless, we briefly discuss some key parts 
that are relevant to our analysis.  
The legacy of government-led industrialization in Japan beginning in 
the Meiji period was critical. Dating back to the Tokugawa Shogunate, 
Japanese industry was regarded as an “instrument of national policy” and 
therefore was developed and directed by political elites.37 The 1868 Meiji 
 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See, e.g., RICHARD E. CAVES & MASU UEKUSA, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN 
(1976); ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 3–106 (1970); HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI 
UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 1–10 (1994); MASAYO OHARA, DEMOCRATIZATION 
AND EXPANSIONISM: HISTORICAL LESSONS, CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES 13–165 (2001); Harry 
First, Antitrust in Japan: The Original Intent, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 6–16 (2000); Yoshio 
Kanazawa, The Regulation of Corporate Enterprise: The Law of Unfair Competition and the Control 
of Monopoly Power, in LAW IN JAPAN 480–506 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 1963); Hugh T. 
Patrick, The Economic Muddle of the 1920’s, in DILEMMAS OF GROWTH IN PREWAR JAPAN 211–66 
(James William Morley ed., 1971); Alex Y. Seita & Jiro Tamura, The Historical Background of 
Japan’s Antimonopoly Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 115 (1994); Arthur T. Tiedemann, Big Business and 
Politics in Prewar Japan, in DILEMMAS OF GROWTH IN PREWAR JAPAN 267–316 (James William 
Morley ed., 1971); SPECIAL SURVEY COMMITTEE, JAPAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1946), 
compiled and translated in SABURO OKITA, POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 
(1992). 
 37. Kanazawa, supra note 36, at 480–82. 
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Restoration of imperial rule and the associated impetus for development 
was conducive to government intervention and guidance of the economy.38 
Thus, government-led development through active investment in, and 
control of, the economy persisted through the turn of the century.39 The 
Meiji government actively promoted specific large-scale sectors starting 
with defense-related industries such as munitions and shipbuilding and 
turning later to consumer goods industries.40 Policies included creation of 
state enterprises and encouragement of technology transfers from the West 
to equip those enterprises.41 In the 1880s, government ministries fostered 
the growth of trade associations in small and medium scale industries to 
facilitate the Meiji development agenda.42 Through these trade 
associations, government ministries occasionally administered horizontal 
agreements in specific industries (such as paper manufacturing and cotton 
spinning) to avoid excessive competition and declining product quality, 
which were thought to be inevitable in the absence of cartels.43 Eventually 
the state of public finances led to privatization of these large state-
developed enterprises. The public assets were sold to private interests, and 
ended up being concentrated in the hands of “preferred” business groups, 
which eventually became the zaibatsu.44 
In the 1920s, cartelization policies were championed by government 
ministries to prevent excessive competition among the zaibatsu 
combines45 that had come to dominate the Japanese economy.46 From the 
government’s perspective, cartels prevented destructive competition and 
served as a mechanism for guiding the economy.47 Given these perceived 
benefits, cartels were encouraged and enforced through trade associations, 
beginning with export industries in 1925.48 Legislation termed the “Export 
Society Law” and the “Major Export Commodities Industrial Association 
Law,” legalized horizontal agreements among export sectors and gave 
government ministries the ability to force firms to join export cartels.49 
 
 
 38. HADLEY, supra note 36, at 37. 
 39. First, supra note 36, at 8–16. 
 40. Kanazawa, supra note 36, at 480–82 
 41. Id. 
 42. MARK TILTON, RESTRAINED TRADE: CARTELS IN JAPAN’S BASIC MATERIALS INDUSTRIES 
27–29 (1966). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Kanazawa, supra note 36, at 481–82. 
 45. A “combine” is defined as “a complex of corporations displaying unified business strategy 
arising primarily out of an ownership base.” HADLEY, supra note 36, at 20. 
 46. Id. at 482. 
 47. HADLEY, supra note 36, at 363–64. 
 48. Id. at 364–65 (citing Kanazawa, supra note 12, at 482). 
 49. Id. at 365. 
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More extensive cartelization of the economy followed the Great 
Depression and the subsequent militarization of Japan. During the 1930s, 
garden-variety cartel agreements appeared in sectors such as wholesaling, 
coal mining, cement, and textiles.50 These arrangements, which were often 
enforced by government ministries, restricted production, fixed prices, and 
allocated markets.51 Leading up to World War II, trade associations in 
strategic industries were transformed into wartime control associations 
(toseikai) under direct bureaucratic control while trade associations in 
other sectors operated as independent cartels with government support.52 
Norms and practices influencing merger policy also emerged during 
the pre-war period. As noted earlier, government-directed development 
and the eventual divestiture of assets to privileged families led to the 
formation of the zaibatsu.53 These business groupings exerted control over 
their subsidiaries though a variety of measures including shareholding 
through holding companies, interlocking directorates, “centralized buying 
and selling,” written agreements, and ownership of financial institutions.54 
These “control techniques” laid the groundwork for the post-war structure 
of the economy. In particular, the main bank system, in which business 
groups (zaibatsu and later keiretsu) were associated with a particular bank, 
grew out of these zaibatsu control techniques and would later have a 
significant effect on merger policy.55 The practice of cross-shareholding 
(between firms linked to business groups as well as between firms and 
their main banks) was an essential aspect of this control system which also 
became ingrained in Japanese economic practice during this period.56  
During World War II, the 1938 National General Mobilization Law 
gave the government authority to force mergers in strategic industries.57 In 
1941, the Major Industries Association Ordinance gave industry “control 
associations” the ability to compel horizontal mergers between small 
firms.58 These laws were designed with wartime command of the economy 
in mind and resulted in increased concentration and decreased competition 
in the immediate post-war Japanese economy.59 More significantly, they 
 
 
 50. Kanazawa, supra note 36, at 483. 
 51. MICHAEL L. BEEMAN, PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION IN JAPAN 14 (2002). 
 52. TILTON, supra note 42, at 28. 
 53. See HADLEY, supra note 36, at 21, 35; Kanazawa, supra 36, at 480–82. 
 54. HADLEY, supra note 36, at 28–29. 
 55. See infra notes 239–41 and accompanying text. 
 56. HADLEY, supra note 36, at 28–29. 
 57. Kanazawa, supra note 36, at 483–84. 
 58. First, supra note 36, at 12–14. 
 59. Id. at 12–13. 
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established the principle that mergers, like horizontal agreements, were 
subject to bureaucratic guidance and permission.60  
At the end of World War II, Japan was put under an American-led 
occupation termed the “Supreme Command of Allied Powers” (SCAP).61 
The United States believed that the restructuring of Japan’s economy to 
attain “economic democratization” was a necessary step towards avoiding 
future conflict, and three primary policies were recommended to achieve 
this end.62 First, the zaibatsu was dissolved in order to de-concentrate 
economic power. Second, Japan was directed to draft and implement 
antitrust legislation. In 1947 the “Law Concerning the Prohibition of 
Private Monopoly and the Maintenance of Fair Trade” (popularly known 
as the Antimonopoly Law or AML) was passed, and a new body, the Fair 
Trade Commission of Japan (JFTC) was created to enforce this law.63 
Third, the harmful conduct of trade associations was to be halted. In 1946, 
SCAP began dissolving the wartime control associations as part of this 
economic democratization, but the process was never fully completed for 
fear of serious economic destabilization.64 In order to deal with the 
potential anti-competitive behavior of trade associations, the “Trade 
Association Law” was passed in 1948 prohibiting all of the significant 
functions of these organizations.65 These new laws were not well received 
by government ministries (particularly the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, which later became MITI and more recently METI66) or by 
businessmen accustomed to the pre-World War II government guidance 
and cartelization, since the AML and the Trade Association Law severely 
restricted their ability to continue these practices.67  
While pre-war Japan was characterized by a plethora of horizontal 
agreements, many mandated by the government, it is important to note that 
industries were not particularly highly concentrated in an industrial 
organization sense during this period.68 Although aggregate concentration 
 
 
 60. See id. at 13–14. 
 61. Id. at 32. 
 62. See id. at 24–30. 
 63. First, supra note 36, at 21–29. 
 64. ULRIKE SCHAEDE, SELF REGULATION, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND THE ANTIMONOPOLY 
LAW IN JAPAN 73 (2000). 
 65. Id. at 77. Under the Trade Association Law, trade association activities were limited to “the 
areas of exchange of technical information, quality and standard regulation, and negotiation with labor 
unions.” Id. 
 66. See MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY, HISTORY OF METI, available at 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/aboutmeti/data/ahistory.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
 67. HADLEY, supra note 36, at 372. 
 68. JOE STATEN BAIN, INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE—EIGHT 
NATIONS IN THE 1950S 81–90 (1966). 
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was high in that a handful of zaibatsu controlled a large share of industrial 
assets, the zaibatsu were generally conglomerates and did not focus on 
single industries and markets.69 Seller concentration in individual markets, 
which is a basis for the market power concerns of competition policy, was 
not significantly greater than what was found in the United States in the 
1950s.70 Based on data from the early and mid 1950s, Bain found that top-
level seller concentration in Japan was approximately equal to or slightly 
greater than the concentration in the United States.71 A decade later, Caves 
and Uekusa came to much the same conclusion using a broader sample of 
industries and a later time period.72 In summary, during the early post-war 
period, Japan’s industrial structure, in terms of concentration measures, 
was no less competitive than that of the United States. Industry conduct 
certainly differed, but industry structure did not. It follows that a 
productive competition policy would focus on anticompetitive conduct 
and, when necessary, implement conduct-oriented remedies.  
In the discussion that follows, we will refer to two key economic 
indicators: the annual rate of growth of real GDP and annual percent 
changes in price levels. These are shown in Figure 2. The years 1953 to 
1973 were boom years with annual GDP growth averaging ten percent. 
Growth dropped with the first oil shock in the early 1970s and then 
maintained a healthy average of four percent until the end of the 1980s. 
The 1990s and first years of the new century were marked by economic 
stagnancy. Inflation was very modest in the 1953-1972 period. It spiked 
with the oil shock, and then fell back to its pre-shock level. The 1991-2004 
period experienced very low inflation, and in some years experienced 
actual deflation.  
 
 
 69. Eugene Rotwein, Economic Concentration and Monopoly in Japan, 72 J. POL. ECON. 262–77 
(1964). 
 70. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 71. BAIN, supra note 68, at 81–90. 
 72. CAVES & UEKUSA, supra note 36, at 16–28. 
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FIGURE 1 
YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES IN CONSUMER PRICES AND REAL GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT73 
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B. The Regulatory Norms  
A thorough description of a society’s norms is a daunting task, and one 
best left to initiates. Here we identify what most commentators believe to 
be the basic norms underlying a jurisdiction’s views on competition 
policy. In the case at hand, American rules were imported into Japan, so 
the norms in these two jurisdictions warrant review. 
Most, if not all, U.S. undergraduate textbooks dealing with antitrust 
economics include a discussion of the political, social, cultural, legal, and 
economic underpinnings of that country’s competition policy. There are 
usually references to the importance of liberal individualism (whether 
 
 
 73. Derived from Search of International Monetary Fund Databases electronic data files, series 
158/64.x, 158/99B.C., 158/99BVR, SFU Library (Nov. 2005) (Growth rates are year-to-year changes 
in real GDP). 
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couched in those terms or not), emphasis on the concepts of freedom of 
opportunity and freedom of choice, and acknowledgement of Americans’ 
abiding mistrust of the concentration of power in either public or private 
hands.  
American historian Richard Hofstader claimed there were three kinds 
of goals in U.S. antitrust policy: 
The first were economic; the classical model of competition 
confirmed the belief that the maximum of economic efficiency 
would be produced by competition . . . . The second class of goals 
was political; the antitrust principle was intended to block private 
accumulation of power and protect democratic government. The 
third was social and moral; the competitive process was believed to 
be a kind of disciplinary machinery for the development of 
character, and the competitiveness of the people—the fundamental 
stimulus to national morale—was believed to need protection.74 
This is not to say that the norms underlying antitrust policy have been 
completely consistent over the past century. When markets falter, faith in 
individual efforts and fear of big government and big business can 
diminish.75 Nonetheless, while enthusiasm for antitrust enforcement might 
wax and wane depending upon the economic and political mood of the 
country, the antitrust laws have remained in place. “Throughout the 20th 
century, America’s antitrust laws have coexisted uneasily with policies 
that favor extensive government intervention in the economy through 
planning, ownership, or sweeping controls over prices and entry.”76 
Ignoring for a moment the support for antitrust policy on economic 
efficiency grounds, the core values or norms that underlie Americans’ 
commitment to antitrust policy are a dedication to the protection and 
enhancement of individual freedom and a concomitant distrust of 
concentrated economic power.77 According to Eleanor Hadley, this runs 
counter to core Japanese norms. “The Japanese tradition puts emphasis on 
the group, and further lacks the notion that power is likely to be abused. In 
our Western individualistic tradition we worry about power and suspect 
 
 
 74. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 
199–200 (1965). 
 75. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal 
Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 43, 47–48 (2000). 
 76. Id. at 58. 
 77. HADLEY, supra note 36, at 372. 
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the motives of businessmen gathering together to discuss output, prices, 
etc.78  
There seems to be some (but not complete) consensus that there was a 
significant difference between these two countries in terms of regulatory 
norms—individualism versus group orientation and statism versus 
antistatism.79 Clearly, there are other important societal norms, but this 
subset, which we call regulatory norms, are particularly important with 
respect to competition policy. In turn, these regulatory norms are ingrained 
in observable rules as well as the processes and practices of enforcement 
and adjudication institutions.  
Conformity with regulatory norms leads to certain types of behavior. 
For example, a group orientation leads to an emphasis on social harmony 
and consensus.80 This emphasis in turn leads to an aversion to competition 
and a lack of faith in market mechanisms because these forces could upset 
the maintenance of harmony within the group.81 Combine this with a 
statist propensity, and the result is a set of norms that is consistent with 
state intervention in the economy and a disinterest in pro-competition 
policies. And so it was in Japan. 
As noted in our brief historical sketch, Japan’s rapid industrialization 
after the Meiji Restoration owed much to state intervention. The overall 
policy was an obvious success and understandably legitimized government 
intervention in the economy.  
 
 
 78. Id.  
 79. It is an incomplete consensus because some observers take issue even with this conventional 
wisdom. For example, Fukuyama makes the observation that much of the literature on national 
competitiveness of the late 1980s and early 1990s made the assumption that Japan is a ‘group-
oriented’ society and the United States is the epitome of an individualistic society. He contends that 
the United States is less individualistic than Americans believe it to be but does accept that Americans 
are much more antistatist than the Japanese. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST—THE SOCIAL VIRTUES 
AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 269–81 (1995). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See, e.g., HADLEY, supra note 36, at 372; CAVES & UEKUSA, supra note 72, at 1–2, 47–48; 
KANJI ISHIZUMI, ACQUIRING JAPANESE COMPANIES 13 (1990); Leszek Leszczýnski, Economic 
Guidance and The Antimonopoly Law: Tradition versus Legal Changes, in JAPAN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
EVOLUTION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 221, 222 (Sarah Metzger-Court and Werner Pascha eds., 
1996); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional 
Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 638 (1985); Douglas E. Rosenthal & Mitsuo 
Matsushita, Competition in Japan and the West, Can the Approaches be Reconciled?, in GLOBAL 
COMPETITION POLICY 313, 319 (Edward M. Graham and J. David Richardson eds., 1997); Steven K. 
Vogel, Can Japan Disengage? Winners and Loser in Japan’s Political Economy, and the Ties that 
Bind Them, 2 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 3 (1999) (expressing aversion to liberalization in an effort to maintain 
societal stability). 
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Harry First82 argues that Japan’s history of economic development led 
to what he calls a “bureaucratic regulatory culture,” which he defines in 
the following terms: 
A bureaucratic regulatory culture is focused on how the economy 
should be structured and run. Its core concern is economic welfare 
and it works by guidance. This type of regulation is group-oriented, 
theory-based, and forward-looking. The decisionmaking model is 
consensual, and rigorous justification for particular decisions is not 
only unnecessary but may be unwise.83  
Within this normative framework, cartels and trade associations played 
a valuable role by enabling the government to (1) guide the economy 
towards particular industrial policy goals, (2) gather information about 
industries, and (3) communicate with industries.84 Information exchange 
(facilitated by trade associations) was particularly useful and was fostered 
by the government within this regulatory culture.85 Mergers and 
acquisitions were also important in this type of regulatory regime; control 
of mergers allowed the bureaucracy to shape the economic structure as it 
saw fit.86  
First distinguishes between the regulatory cultures that characterized 
the conception and implementation of antitrust in the United States and in 
Japan.87 The United States competition policy operates within a 
framework of “legalistic regulation” intended to protect victims from 
“improper business conduct.”88 “Antitrust in Japan was placed in a very 
different regulatory culture, one which viewed antitrust (and economic 
law) as a tool of government that bureaucrats might use to guide and 
manage the economy.”89 Hiroshi Iyori has the same view: “the 
[antimonopoly] law in Japan is, by contrast [to the law in the West], 
considered primarily an instrument of government control, especially 
bureaucratic control.”90 Along these same lines, J. Mark Ramseyer argues 
 
 
 82. First, supra note 36, at 5–6; cf. Harry First, Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, 64 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 137, 138–45 (1995). 
 83. First, supra note 36, at 6. 
 84. TILTON, supra note 42, at 27. 
 85. SCHAEDE, supra note 64, at 17–18. 
 86. See infra notes 268–70 and accompanying text. 
 87. First, supra note 82, at 138. 
 88. First, supra note 36, at 4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Hiroshi Iyori, Antitrust and Industrial Policy in Japan: Competition and Cooperation, in 
LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 62 (Gary Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 
1986). 
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that this “perception of harmony is crucial, for it plays a central part in 
legitimating bureaucratic rule in Japan.”91 
C. Application: Cartels 
For convenience we have divided the evolution of cartel policy into a 
number of periods. Each is marked by a change in the environment that 
impacted the adaptation process.  
1. Adoption: 1947–1952 
The power relationship between foreign and local regulatory norms 
during the post-war occupation of Japan is clear.92 By all accounts, Japan’s 
Antimonopoly Law was drafted and passed under pressure from American 
authorities.93 “The record of the drafting of the Antimonopoly Law reveals 
an authority imbalance between the two sides. The U.S. side set the broad 
policy for the direction of the legislation, a policy direction that the Japan 
side, under occupation, had little choice but to follow.”94 In the years 
immediately following the imposition of the AML, the presence of the 
occupation forces maintained similar power relations between the two 
parties. 
Under these circumstances, there was little room for the Japanese 
negotiators to selectively adapt the rules dictated by the victors. The U.S. 
terms were adopted regardless of whether the underlying norms fit with 
Japanese views in terms of perception, legitimacy, and complementarity.95  
There is some debate as to Japanese perceptions of the purpose and 
goals of the AML. First contends that “negotiators from Japan’s 
government understood perfectly well what the legislation was about.”96 
Richard E. Caves and Masu Uekusa argue that the AML “employed novel 
terms such as ‘public interest,’ ‘substantial,’ and ‘competition’ that 
conveyed no clear meaning to the Japanese public who would have to 
comply with it.”97 Hideaki Kobayashi, a high-ranking official in the JFTC, 
states that “the competition law, when it was introduced 50 years ago, was 
something totally unknown to political leaders, government officials, and 
 
 
 91. Ramseyer, supra note 81, at 638.  
 92. First, supra note 36, at 67. 
 93. Id. at 68. 
 94. Id. at 67. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1. 
 97. CAVES & UEKUSA, supra note 72, at 142. 
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the general public in Japan”.98 Rather than being simply “unknown,” some 
Japanese apparently believed there were sinister motivations behind the 
policy viewing the AML as a foreign method of keeping Japan weak and 
subordinated to the U.S. “There are many who profess, and in all 
appearance honestly believe, that the Antimonopoly Law, along with the 
Standards of Labor Law, was forced by the victors upon the defeated 
nation for the covert purpose of keeping down her economy in a weak 
condition.”99 
In any case, given the statist views held by Japanese policymaking 
elites, it was not surprising that policies to facilitate unregulated, 
competitive markets were not embraced. 
But what were the preferred policies? In his analysis of the original 
intent of the AML, First emphasizes the role of the Special Survey 
Committee (SSC), a group of economists and technical experts that was 
formed just before cessation of hostilities to plan for post-war 
reconstruction.100 The SSC report was published in September 1946 and 
was comprehensive,101 providing valuable insights into the Japanese 
position on issues relevant to competition policy generally, and horizontal 
agreements specifically. The recommendations of the report were not 
directly implemented, but they did provide a conceptual basis for 
economic planning over the next decades.102 The career of the report’s 
initiator, Saburo Okita, reflects that influence.103  
The SSC’s proposals for revamping the organization of Japanese 
industry merit review:  
Reorganization of the Industrial Setup. The industrial setup was as 
firmly connected to the State structure as was the financial setup. In 
order to democratize the industrial setup it will be therefore 
 
 
 98. Hideaki Kobayashi, Deputy Sec’y-Gen., Fair Trade Comm’n of Japan, Competition Policy 
Objectives—A Japanese View, Speech Before the Competition Workshop 1 (June 13–14, 1997), 
available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/policyupdates/speeches/97-0613.html. 
 99. HADLEY, supra note 36, at 11 (quoting RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES STUDY TEAM, 
JAPAN PRODUCTIVITY CENTER, CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES IN JAPAN 8–9 (1958)). 
 100. See First, supra note 36. 
 101. Takafusa Nakamura, Introduction, in OKITA, supra note 36, at 1 ix. 
 102. See First, supra note 39, at 16–21. 
 103. Saburo Okita, an electrical engineer by training, became interested in economic planning 
after analyzing possibilities for the development of power resources and industrial development in 
occupied China where he served from 1939 to 1941. In the immediate post-war years he held research 
positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Economic Stabilization Board. In 1956 he was 
named Director of the Planning Bureau of Japan’s Economic Planning Agency. He ultimately served 
as Japan’s Foreign Minister. In 1992, he compiled an English version of the Special Survey Committee 
(SSC) Report. 
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necessary to get rid of the past feudalistic and militaristic capitalist 
system by relieving the industries of State power once and for all. 
This will make it difficult in principle for big business to make an 
appearance in Japan in the future. On the other hand, in order that 
technological levels be elevated and the rationalization of business 
management be accomplished it is desirable that big business 
management be accomplished and that big business enterprises 
grow. Such basic industries as railways, communication, electric 
power generation, steelmaking, coal mining, and fertilizer 
manufacture absolutely need large-scale operations. In a country 
like Japan, where domestic markets are small and the raw materials 
base is weak, free competition in these basic industries would not 
necessarily result in their growth, and the need will arise to 
nationalize these industries or give them a public character. 
Nationalization however, will have to be accomplished by measures 
designed to wipe out the bureaucratic inefficiency of the past. 
At the same time, those basic industries which serve domestic non-
governmental or export demand and do not necessarily require a 
large scale operation need to be encouraged to compete as freely 
and fairly as possible. Export industries especially would need a 
system that is so flexible as to allow them to undertake dynamic 
production in accordance with changing world market conditions. 
It will be necessary, in this context, that the Toseikai (Control 
Associations), which was founded during the war, should be 
reorganized into an autonomous association and given the character 
of an organ representing the collective will of business 
entrepreneurs. At the same time a system should be established in 
which public control will be exercised over industries so that the 
interest of consumers can be protected.104 
Basic industries that produced public goods or verged on natural 
monopoly should be nationalized or “given a public character,” which 
presumably meant they should be subjected to direct regulation.105 Basic 
industries with limited scale economies that produced for domestic private 
sector demand or export markets should compete without government 
ownership or direct regulation.106 However, the wartime cartels (“control 
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associations” or Toseikai) that were mandated and effectively controlled 
by the government should be resurrected as private organizations, 
operating without government interference (except in protecting consumer 
interests). Ultimately this did not happen due to the implementation of 
American anti-monopoly policies. 107 
The proposals for smaller, non-basic industries also called for 
cooperation between competitors.  
Smaller enterprises posed serious economic and social problems in 
the past. We should not, in eager pursuit of ease in the immediate 
future, allow them to present such problems again in a more serious 
form in the modern age . . . . It must not be forgotten, however, that 
more essential measures are to improve the quality of these 
enterprises by introducing technical rationalization and economic 
organization into them. The following are the principal measures 
that should be taken . . . . 
2. Promotion of Cooperation among Smaller Enterprises 
Industrial associations need to expand their past function of 
purchasing raw materials and selling products jointly to include 
technological interchanges, joint use of productive equipment, and 
improvement of working conditions. Smaller firms may be enabled 
in this way to benefit substantially from the advantages of large-
scale business management. It is also quite desirable that smaller 
enterprises thus collectivized rationally would compete with other 
collectivized regional groups of smaller firms and collectively 
improve their technological level and efficiency.108 
In short, horizontal agreements among competitors were viewed by the 
Japanese as legitimate and complementary to programmes for post-war 
construction. 
The dominant position of the occupiers in the power relationship was 
clearly reflected in the original wording of the sections of the AML 
dealing with cartels. Simply, Article 4 of the law prohibited cartels per se. 
As such, any “agreements among enterprises in competitive relationship 
 
 
 107. Tetsuji Okazaka, Government Firm Relationship in Postwar Japan: Success and Failure of 
Bureau-Pluralism 4 (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/dp/2000/ 
2000cf69.pdf. 
 108. OKITA, supra note 36, at 117–18. 
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(Cartels) as regards price, territory of activities, quantity of production, 
and other terms of business” were prohibited unless the impact of the 
agreement on competition was “negligible.”109 The inclusion of the 
outright per se prohibition of cartels was at the firm insistence of 
American negotiators to the dismay of Japanese negotiators of the 
AML.110 In the final stages of drafting, the Japanese representatives 
requested (to no avail) that the wording of Article 4 be changed such that 
cartels would only be prohibited if they “substantially restrained 
competition . . . contrary to the public interest.”111 
Despite this per se prohibition, another potential source of horizontal 
agreements remained in trade associations. As discussed above, in 1946 
SCAP dissolved the wartime control associations because of their role in 
cartelization of the Japanese economy.112 Nevertheless, many of these 
dissolved associations reappeared within a few years as trade associations 
under different names while maintaining very similar functions and 
personnel.113 Although the trade associations were private sector 
institutions, the bureaucracy continued to wield significant influence, 
employing the associations in their efforts to control and direct the 
economy.114 The inability of the Occupation authorities to prevent the re-
emergence of previously dissolved associations resulted in the passage of 
the “Trade Association Law” in 1947 to complement the AML, which 
specifically dealt with antitrust violations by trade associations.115 Price-
fixing by associations was made per se illegal, and they were prohibited 
from engaging in a broad range of activities that could assist inter-firm 
cooperation.116 Furthermore, any undue influence wielded by bureaucrats 
over trade associations was considered a violation.117 Here the Japanese 
government’s and business community’s adaptation to the original order to 
dissolve the Toseikai, through public reformation of trade associations, 
 
 
 109. MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN JAPAN 78 (1993). 
The exemption for cartels that have a “negligible” effect on competition does move the prohibition 
slightly away from a strict per se status. Apparently a completely ineffective cartel could escape 
censure. See id. 
 110. First, supra note 36, at 63. 
 111. Id. 
 112. SCHAEDE, supra note 64, at 73. 
 113. See First, supra note 36, at 76–77. 
 114. LEONARD H. LYNN & TIMOTHY J. MCKEOWN, ORGANIZING BUSINESS: TRADE 
ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICA AND JAPAN 26–27 (1988). 
 115. SCHAEDE, supra note 64, at 77 (For example, “Glorious Bōren” was a cotton spinning 
association that was dissolved by SCAP in 1947 but reformed directly with the same firms and staff, 
and was later (1952) able to successfully cartelize cotton spinning production and output.). 
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was thwarted by supplementary legislation from the Occupation 
authorities. 
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), a new quasi-judicial 
agency, was created to enforce the AML.118 In First’s view, the most 
“critical point(s) of contention” between the Americans and the Japanese 
was how independent the commission would be and “to which 
government official it would report.”119 Ultimately the JFTC was given a 
good deal of independence and, at the recommendation of the Americans, 
made accountable to the Prime Minister.120 The JFTC was not given 
cabinet rank and this, according to James Fry, put it in a subservient 
position relative to other ministries responsible for economic regulation, 
specifically the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and 
the Ministry of Finance.121 This relationship became quite important 
during the 1952-1972 period. 
In effect, the JFTC was given exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement 
of the AML. Yoshiro Miwa and Ramseyer, First and Tadashi Shiraishi, 
and Michael Beeman argue that this “monopoly over antimonopoly 
services” impaired enforcement from the outset.122 
The point of departure for any discussion of the JFTC’s role must 
be the fact that the Commission essentially maintains a monopoly 
on antimonopoly services in Japan . . . . One Japanese scholar has 
labeled the JFTC’s commanding position over antitrust enforcement 
the “original sin.”123  
According to First, Japanese negotiators of the AML knowingly sought 
to hobble private enforcement by requiring victims of anticompetitive acts 
to channel complaints through the JFTC.124 As a result, an aggrieved party 
can file a damage suit only after the agency makes a decision. Also, unlike 
 
 
 118. Id. at 75. 
 119. First, supra note 36, at 58. 
 120. Id. 
 121. James Fry, Struggling to Teethe: Japan’s Antitrust Enforcement Regime, 32 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 825, 835 (2001) (citing ELLIOTT J. HAIN, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM 132 (1984)). 
 122. See generally Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Toward a Theory of Jurisdictional 
Competition: The Case of the Japanese FTC, 1 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 247, 251–55 (2005); Michael L. 
Beeman, Japan’s Flawed Antitrust Regime (The Friendship Comm’n Pub. Policy Series Working 
Paper 1999) (Revised Nov. 11, 1999), available at http://www.jiaponline.org/whatsnew/ 
events/2000/june5/FinalJapansFlawedAntitrustRegime1199.pdf; Harry First & Tadashi Shiraishi, 
Concentrated Power: The Paradox of Antitrust in Japan 16–21 (New York University Law and 
Economics Working Papers: Paper No. 11 2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/11. 
 123. Beeman, supra note 122, at 8. 
 124. First, supra note 36, at 68–70. 
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in the United States, there was no provision for treble damages.125 These 
disincentives, combined with other more general constraints on litigation, 
led Ramseyer to conclude that “[t]he institutional barriers to litigation in 
Japan have, it appears, all but eliminated private antitrust damage suits.”126 
First concludes his review of the original intent of the AML by arguing 
that the enforcement mechanism was intended to keep competition policy 
a component of bureaucratic economic regulation. 
[T]he Japan side fought so hard to keep antitrust enforcement within 
the control of the bureaucracy by narrowing the private right of 
action and resisting all efforts to provide the antitrust enforcement 
agency with a legal staff that could independently seek relief in 
court. Antitrust enforcement would be a component of bureaucratic 
economic regulation rather than a part of a legal structure which 
could be utilized by those harmed by anticompetitive conduct.127 
In sum, the power relationship during the drafting of the AML obliged 
Japan to enact anti-cartel legislation that was not reflective of Japanese 
regulatory norms. On the other hand, the mechanics of enforcement, 
specifically the role of JFTC, were consistent with those norms.  
3. Adaptation: 1952–Present 
Given the brief time period in which the AML was crafted, and the 
dominant power of the Occupation authorities, the initial period of 
implementation of competition policy in Japan might better be described 
as adoption rather than adaptation. When the Occupation ended in 1952, 
the previously binding power constraints weakened and adaptation became 
possible.128 The following half century can be divided into three periods: 
(1) the so-called “Dark Ages” of Japanese antitrust from 1952 to 1972, 
during which time competition policy was brought into line with the local 
regulatory norms; (2) a period of resuscitation from 1972 up to the late 
1980s, when local norms slowly came into greater alignment with foreign 
norms; and (3) the period from the early 1990s to the present, when altered 
power relationships combined with a failure by the bureaucratic regulatory 
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regime to maintain economic performance led to a more profound 
acceptance of the principles and practices of American antitrust policy.129 
What follows is a broad descriptive analysis. We do not provide a 
complete review of the vast literature dealing with the evolution of 
Japanese competition policy. The purpose is simply to see whether the 
selective adaptation model can help to explain the evolution. 
a. The Dark Ages: 1952–1972  
The later years of the American Occupation marked a “reverse course” 
in U.S. policy.130 With the onset of the Korean War, the United States 
recognized a strong strategic interest in a robust Japanese economy, an 
economy that was struggling with reconstruction.131 “Democratization” of 
the economy took a backseat to recovery, and American interest in the 
enforcement of the AML and industrial restructuring waned.132 Also in 
1952, the formal conclusion to the Occupation produced a fundamental 
change in the power relationship between Japan and the United States.133 
These changes in the power dynamics empowered Japanese elites to 
express local regulatory norms. “No sooner had the Antimonopoly Law 
been enacted than agitation began for its amendment.”134 Of particular 
importance to government and business leaders was reform of the cartel 
provisions, which they perceived as detrimental to reconstruction efforts 
and achievement of higher growth rates.135 The Trade Association Law 
was also a major point of contention, as it essentially eliminated all 
significant functions of trade associations and viewed all scales of 
organization as synonymous (in that the two businessmen gathering 
together were treated the same as an industry association with five 
hundred members), creating widespread opposition.136 The absence of any 
significant political will to enforce the AML against cartels, combined 
with pressure from the business lobby and government ministries to relax 
the cartel provision, led to amendment of the AML in 1953.137 The per se 
prohibition of cartels was removed from the law, and “cartels were now 
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prohibited only if they caused substantial restraint of competition in a 
particular field of trade.”138 Importantly, the amendment allowed for 
rationalization (Article 24(4)) and recession cartels (Article 24(3)) subject 
to JFTC approval. “This aspect of the amendment signified a change in 
policy towards cartels in the sense that under this amendment, there were 
‘good cartels’ and ‘bad cartels’, whereas in the original AML all cartels 
were regarded as basically ‘bad.’”139 The Trade Associations Law was 
also repealed in the 1953 amendment.140 Rules governing trade 
associations were amalgamated into Section 8 of the amended AML.141 
The modified legislation was severely weakened because it removed all 
specific prohibitions on trade association activities (in particular relating to 
information gathering and sharing), replacing them with broad 
provisions142 “leading to a revival of cooperation within trade 
associations.”143 
This amendment did not satisfy the pro-cartel forces. Government 
bureaucrats (especially MITI personnel) and businessmen wanted to be 
able to establish and enforce cartels of their own accord, independent of 
the JFTC and above the application of the AML.144 Their lobbying efforts 
were rewarded with the passage of laws granting AML exemptions to 
government encouraged cartels (to restrict production, fix prices, and 
allocate markets) for exporters and small and medium enterprises.145 
These were the Export-Import Transactions Law and the Medium and 
Small Enterprise Stabilization Law.146 Additional laws exempting cartels, 
usually targeted at specific industries, were passed at the recommendation 
of MITI throughout the 1950s and 1960s.147 Some of the industries 
affected included coal mining, fisheries, and distilling.148  
Another sort of cartel exemption that emerged in the early 1950s was 
the so-called “administrative guidance” cartel.149 A government ministry 
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(typically MITI) would recommend cartel measures (typically production 
cutbacks) through informal guidance offered to an industry association in 
response to perceived problems in that industry. Relevant government 
ministries negotiated with a particular industry to cut back production in 
the face of the recession creating a de-facto output cartel.150 The 
justification for the output recommendations was that quotas were 
determined by MITI, when in fact quotas were often the product of prior 
negotiations among the firms within their industry associations.151 
Beginning in 1952 with the Glorious Boren cotton-spinning output 
cartel,152 similar arrangements proliferated in trade associations 
throughout the Japanese economy.153  
MITI’s active encouragement of cartels through trade associations 
as a countermeasure to recession signaled to industries that cartels 
were not only permissible but desirable . . . . Companies learned 
that the default reaction to an economic problem was to talk to the 
other companies in the industry . . . . Over time, the repeated 
negotiations among firms resulted in an increasing propensity to 
cooperate in many industries. The “cartel-mindedness” of the 
Japanese zaikai [business circles], which SCAP had tried to 
expunge, was revived.154 
The resulting cartels were exempt from the AML on a quasi-legal basis 
in that they were the result of an administrative measure of the 
government.155 The JFTC generally did not immediately take action 
against these cartels at first.156  
Table 1 shows the proliferation of cartels that were explicitly exempted 
from the AML. Waldenberger estimates that there were relatively few 
implicitly exempted administrative cartels during this period.157  
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TABLE 1 
EXPLICIT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS: 1954–1973158 
 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1973 
Recession & Rationalization 
Cartels (AML 24-3 and 24-4) 0 7 13 12 30 12 12 
Laws Exempting Cartels 
among Small and Medium 
Enterprises* 
77 289 542 888 989 866 911 
Other Special Cartel 
Exemption Laws 
2 15 40 51 60 76 56 
Total  79 312 595 951 1079 954 979 
The reasoning behind these explicit and implicit exemptions was 
usually the suppression of “excessive competition.”159 Interestingly, these 
exempted cartels were not present in the highly productive and highly 
competitive sectors of the economy, but rather were concentrated in low-
productivity sectors of the economy characterized by small and medium 
enterprises.160 As shown in Table 1, the overwhelming majority of legal 
cartels fell under the small and medium-sized enterprises exemption. The 
granting of exemptions in these sectors is reflective of the adaptation 
process. Without horizontal agreements, there would have been serious 
structural adjustments in these low-productivity industries and this would 
have engendered the “destruction of societal harmony and stability.”161 
When Iyori and Uesugi labeled the 1952–1973 period the Dark Ages of 
antitrust in Japan, they aptly summarized the enforcement of cartel 
provisions (or the lack thereof) during this time.162 By the early 1950s the 
JFTC was forced to change its approach after having been relatively active 
in enforcing against cartel violations under the guidance and support of 
American Occupation authorities.163 Following the end of the Allied 
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Occupation, limited enforcement and avoidance of legal action against 
violations became the modus operandi of the JFTC.164 The JFTC launched 
forty-eight formal actions against cartels between 1953 and 1973.165 These 
actions generally involved a recommendation decree by the JFTC to the 
offending parties to correct anti-competitive behavior.166 No criminal 
action was taken against cartels in this period.167 As a result, there was 
little deterrence to cartels even if they did not qualify for one of the many 
exemptions. There was no real penalty, monetary or otherwise.168  
It is clear that the Japanese cartel policy was extensively adapted and 
brought into line with the bureaucratic regulatory norm during this early 
period. In effect the anti-cartel provisions were weakened, if not gutted, by 
the removal of the per se prohibition, the revival of trade associations, the 
establishment of explicit and implicit exceptions to the general 
prohibition, limited enforcement, and weak remedies.  
b. Resuscitation: 1972–1989  
In the early 1970s, several forces came together to alter the state of 
selective adaptation of anti-cartel rules in Japan. Inflation stemming from 
the 1973 oil shock became a serious public concern as economic growth 
faltered.169 The widespread cartelization of the economy was seen as part 
of the problem,170 which de-legitimized the local regulatory norms that 
had promoted horizontal agreements to begin with. 
Local regulatory norms faced serious challenges in the political and 
economic context of the high inflationary period of the 1970s. JFTC 
enforcement actions against cartels reached record highs in 1973, but 
apparently this had little effect on deterring further violations.171 In an 
effort to assert its ability to combat and deter these violations, the JFTC 
launched a criminal action against an oil industry cartel in 1974.172 This 
was a suitable target given the public outcry against cartelization and the 
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inflation related to the oil price shock.173 This case marked the first 
criminal action against cartelization in the history of the AML.174 Several 
oil companies were accused of price-fixing and production limitation 
arrangements.175 The companies pleaded innocence, claiming they were 
following the administrative guidance of MITI in the context of the oil 
crisis.176 The companies certainly did have a case, as MITI had offered 
guidance relating to output limitation,177 but it was clear that the 
companies had gone beyond those recommendations in their 
arrangements.178 Since they were at least partly following the 
administrative guidance of MITI and there was some doubt as to whether 
they knew they were breaking the law, the sentences imposed on the 
colluding executives were suspended.179 As Kenji Sanekata and Stephen 
Wilks characterized the era, “[t]he JFTC won on theory but lost on 
enforcement.”180 The decision of the Japanese Supreme Court in this case 
did not take a definitive stance as to whether administrative guidance 
cartels were legal. “The court stated in dicta that an agreement to restrain 
competition could be justified, even without exempting laws, if it was 
based on a directive or entrustment of the government.”181 
While the decision did create a potential precedent for exemptions 
under administrative guidance, legislation soon aligned with the public’s 
growing hostility towards cartelization. In the wake of the oil cartel case, 
the AML was amended in 1977 to allow for administrative surcharges 
against firms involved in cartel violations.182 The surcharges were set at 
two percent of sales for the period of cartelization, although small and 
medium enterprises were subject to only half this rate.183 In addition, the 
JFTC worked to reduce the number of explicitly exempt cartels throughout 
the economy (see Table 2). 
In the span of five short years between 1973 and 1977, the FTC had 
registered record numbers of formal measures against AML 
violations, including the use of two criminal accusations; [and] 
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successfully undertaken an initiative that nearly halved the total 
number of legal cartels . . . . The basis for the FTC’s successes is 
inseparable from the turbulent political and economic environment 
in which change took place.184  
TABLE 2 
EXPLICIT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS: 1974–1992185 
 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 
Recession & 
Rationalization Cartels 
(AML 24-3 and 24-4) 
0 2 2 4 0 4 0 
Laws Exempting Cartels 
among Small and 
Medium Enterprises* 
851 487 459 444 401 265 215 
Other Special Cartel 
Exemption Laws 57 39 30 23 25 9 6 
Total  908 528 491 471 426 278 221 
In this new policy environment, the JFTC enacted “Guidelines 
Concerning the Activities of Trade Associations Under the Antimonopoly 
Law” in 1979.186 These guidelines clarified the JFTC’s interpretation of 
Section 8 of the AML and indicated what activities the JFTC would view 
as likely violations. Price-related violations cited by the guidelines include 
establishment of a minimum sales price, a standard price, a common 
pricing formula, and limits on rebates.187 The JFTC also articulated 
violations for quantity related and various other general acts. And the 
guidelines clarified available exemptions, in particular setting out in some 
detail what types of information exchange would be viewed as beneficial 
and what types would be viewed as facilitating illicit horizontal 
agreement.188  
With time, inflationary pressures subsided and economic growth 
recovered, albeit not to the very high levels of the earlier period (see 
Figure 2). With the return to prosperity, enforcement of anti-cartel 
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provisions decreased.189 From 1973 to 1977 there were ninety-four formal 
actions initiated by the JFTC against cartels, while there were only thirty-
two actions against cartels from 1978 to 1987.190 Structurally depressed 
industries became an important policy issue in 1978 and laws were passed 
in that year, and reworked in 1983, to allow for extensive coordination of 
business activities of firms (short of overt price-fixing) towards 
restructuring depressed industries.191 Few horizontal agreements were 
exempted under these laws, but the policy imperative of aiding structurally 
depressed industries was an important factor in the decreased enforcement 
activity of cartel provisions.192  
During the 1970s and 1980s, foreign regulatory norms respecting 
cartels were selectively adapted in Japan. When local norms, in this case 
the bureaucratic regulatory regime, failed to deliver prosperity (i.e., lost 
legitimacy), the public and the bureaucrats responsible for enforcement 
were willing to accept a policy more in line with foreign regulatory norms. 
With the return to prosperity, there was less enthusiasm for a strict anti-
cartel policy, and local regulatory norms were once again favored. 
c. Enhancement: 1989–present 
Since the late 1980s, two forces have been at play to erode faith in the 
bureaucratic regulatory model and to enhance support for a stronger 
competition policy. First, the Japanese “bubble economy” burst, and 
partial responsibility was attached to the bureaucratic regulatory regime 
and the “crony-capitalism” it enabled. Second, the United States, suffering 
from a substantial trade deficit with Japan and believing its exports had 
been impeded by restrictive practices in Japan, put pressure on Japanese 
policy makers to more strictly enforce antitrust policy. 
The bursting of the “bubble economy” in the early 1990s had a 
significant impact on anti-cartel policy in Japan because it affected the 
perceived legitimacy of the bureaucratic regulatory model. As was true in 
earlier periods, the model was extolled when the economy worked well 
and questioned during periods of poor performance. There was, however, 
a deeper criticism insofar as many believed the extant regulatory norms 
had not only failed to prevent the downturn, but were partially responsible 
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for it. Critics claimed that the network system, pejoratively called “crony 
capitalism,” was behind a number of economic ills ranging “from 
complacency and uncompetitiveness rooted in inbred trade and investment 
practices to the protection of the corporate unfit and the spread of moral 
hazard due to widespread subsidies and easy bailouts.”193 Emerging 
evidence suggested that Japan’s post-war recovery, and its export success 
in particular, could be explained by high levels of domestic competition in 
specific industries rather than by administrative guidance. In describing 
the rekindled interest in competition policy in the 1990s, a JFTC official 
claimed that the government had come to recognize the positive 
relationship between competition policy and economic growth.194 This 
recognition was apparently based on studies exploring the competitive 
advantage of Japan.195 Perceived complementarities between competition 
policy and local regulatory imperatives significantly altered the state of 
adaptation in Japan. 
During the 1980s the relationship between the United States and Japan 
became strained. By the mid-1970s the United States began to run a 
chronic trade deficit in goods (between 1960 and 1975 it had, on average, 
experienced a modest surplus), and by the mid-1980s the deficits reached 
very high levels (see Figure 3). A significant portion of this deficit was 
attributable to trade with Japan (see Figure 3). Many Americans believed 
that one source of the trade imbalance was the restrictive practices of 
Japanese firms that impeded imports from the United States. To remedy 
this concern, the United States strongly encouraged the Japanese to 
strengthen enforcement of their antitrust laws.196 
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FIGURE 2 
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Evidence of a changed power relationship can be found in the 
establishment of the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) during 1989-
1990. This marked a turning point in the enforcement of competition 
policy, credited by some sources as “creating an anti-monopoly 
renaissance” in Japan in the 1990s.198 These bilateral trade negotiations 
between Japan and the United States devoted significant focus to the role 
of the AML, and its enforcement, as a means to improve the competitive 
environment facing American firms in Japan. Under threat from the 
application of retaliatory protectionist measures, Japan made concessions 
to the gaiatsu (foreign pressure) in some areas of concern, although there 
was lingering resistance regarding competition policy issues.199 That said, 
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OF COMMERCE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS ACCOUNTS DATA, http://www.bea.gov/bea/ 
international/bp_web/simple.cfm?anon=71&table_id=10&area_id=11 (last visited Feb. 2006).  
 198. Sanekata & Wilks, supra note 170, at 107. 
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the SII played an important role in changing the Japanese public’s attitude 
regarding the regulatory regime.200 
Responding to American demands articulated in the SII, the cartel 
penalties were increased (to six percent of sales over the period of 
cartelization) in a 1991 amendment to the AML.201 In addition, the JFTC 
pressed to reduce the number of explicitly exempted cartels. By 1995, the 
number of legal cartels had declined to a “negligible level.”202 The laws 
permitting these legal cartels were all but repealed in the 1997 Omnibus 
Act, which accommodated the 1997 amendment to the AML. The JFTC 
significantly increased its enforcement action beginning in 1990. The first 
criminal charges brought after the oil cartel cases of the 1970s were filed 
against a plastics cartel in 1991.203 The JFTC issued New Trade 
Association Guidelines in 1995, attempting to clarify what constituted 
acceptable “self-regulation [by a trade association]” and what would 
offend the AML.204  
Japanese competition policy is getting stronger. In April 2005, the 
AML was again amended. Penalties were raised to ten percent of sales 
during the period of cartelization and to fifteen percent of sales for repeat 
offenders. A leniency program was introduced to encourage whistle-
blowing by cartel members, an accepted method to destabilize such 
arrangements. There has also been an increase in private suits for 
damages, particularly by municipal governments that have been the 
victims of bid-rigging.205  
4. The Selective Adaptation of Anti-Cartel Policy 
The selective adaptation framework illustrates the evolution of cartel 
policy in Japan. The AML was imposed on Japan in the mid-1940s. At 
that time, respective regulatory norms, horizontal agreements and trade 
association activities diverged markedly between the source of the foreign 
rules (the United States) and the local jurisdiction (Japan). This was 
reflected in perceptions of the intent and anticipated effects of the rules, 
the legitimacy of the rules and views as to whether the rules were 
consistent with local policy goals. The power imbalance between foreign 
and local entities was so great that it trumped the incompatibility of the 
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regulatory norms, and Japan reluctantly legislated a strong anti-cartel law. 
When the power relationship changed, the anti-cartel provisions of the 
AML were diluted and enforcement was largely abandoned.  
A bureaucratic regulatory culture led to bureaucratic guidance of the 
economy. Government bureaus actively encouraged the establishment of 
cartels and then used them to implement economic policy. As long as there 
was an apparent complimentarity between bureaucratic guidance and 
strong, stable economic performance, the Japanese public viewed its 
government’s encouragement and use of horizontal agreements amongst 
competitors as legitimate. When the economy faltered, the Japanese public 
questioned the relationship between bureaucratic guidance and economic 
performance, and policymakers moved to align local rules with the letter 
and spirit of the foreign rules that condemned anti-competitive horizontal 
agreements. Succinctly, Japan came to accept anti-cartel policy when 
policymakers came to believe that a pro-competition policy would 
facilitate attainment of local economic goals, namely: growth, price 
stability, and societal harmony.  
D. Application: Mergers and Acquisitions 
An analysis of Japanese merger control through the selective 
adaptation lens involves a more complex narrative than that of anti-cartel 
policy. Again, the recognition that Japanese economic regulatory norms 
value harmony in society, and operate within a bureaucratic regulatory 
culture, is central to the analysis. As these norms shaped the evolution of 
merger control in Japan, it is important to emphasize their institutional 
manifestations. These include the lifetime employment system, cross 
shareholding, and the main bank system. 
1. Impediments to Merger 
The pursuit of full employment has been a central goal of policymakers 
during the last fifty years and is arguably part of Japan’s social contract.206 
The lifetime employment system that developed in post-war Japan 
reflected the norm of harmony, as social stability was enhanced when the 
economy was at near full employment.207 The practice of lifetime 
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employment commitments, and the strong, almost familial relationship 
between management and employees of a firm created a negative 
perception of mergers and acquisitions (hostile or otherwise),208 due to 
potential workforce rationalization accompanying a change in ownership. 
This social disapproval of hostile takeovers,209 and to a lesser extent 
mergers and acquisitions in general, is well noted in the literature, 
although it has not prevented amalgamations from occurring.  
In order to deter potential acquisitions, groups of friendly firms (and 
their banks) developed extensive inter-corporate cross-shareholding 
relationships to provide a practical defense against takeover bids. Cross-
shareholding was bolstered by the main bank system, whereby corporate 
groupings owned a bank, which in turn was the principal shareholder in 
the group’s firms. This type of arrangement provided a substitute for a 
legalistic corporate governance framework familiar to Western observers, 
and allowed firms the flexibility to pursue goals beyond profit 
maximization. Instead, firms provided output stability and secure lifetime 
employment (as desired by economic bureaucrats), knowing that in the 
case of financial difficulty their main bank would bail them out. It can be 
argued that the main bank system was based on a “social presumption” 
that the bank would support declining and failing firms, and would 
promote “survival of the weakest.”210 This normative interpretation of the 
institution’s role is clearly in line with perceived Japanese social values of 
harmony and stability. Within this economic setting, shareholder rights 
were severely limited, firms were typically not governed with profit 
maximization in mind, and firms rarely went bankrupt.211 
Seen from this local perspective, mergers and acquisitions presented 
either an opportunity or a threat. On the one hand, a friendly merger could 
help a company in trouble maintain social harmony by avoiding layoffs.212 
A merger could also serve to reduce excessive competition in a sector, 
solving a problem that often arose in the eyes of economic bureaucrats. On 
the other hand, a hostile merger or acquisition attempt could threaten the 
Japanese social fabric. Layoffs resulting from restructuring under new 
ownership could de-legitimize the main bank system (and the practice of 
lifetime employment), which was conceived to avoid such an eventuality. 
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Even friendly mergers could threaten local norms by, for example, 
displacing an individual firm’s seniority system in the process of 
combining with the other company.213  
As a result of local economic, regulatory, and social norms, Japanese 
policymakers perceived some mergers in a positive light, but perceived 
many others negatively. Consequently, the history of Japanese merger 
policy displays a tendency to neither encourage nor discourage mergers 
through the selective adaptation process. Instead, the government 
attempted to control mergers and acquisitions such that their outcomes 
were complementary to local norms. Through a “bureaucratic regulatory 
culture,”214 government bureaus promoted defenses against hostile bids 
and avoided profit-seeking shareholders dampening the market for 
corporate control. These regulatory norms also encouraged bureaucrats to 
become directly involved in merger regulation, so that mergers or 
acquisitions perceived as beneficial (e.g., the rescue of a failing firm via 
merger) could be achieved through informal guidance and consultations 
(bypassing potential defense mechanisms). Hence, the selective adaptation 
of merger control was not reflected in the merger legislation itself, but 
rather in policies designed to control behaviors associated with undesirable 
mergers. 
2. The Adaptation of Merger Policy 
a. 1947–1952 
The legacy of wartime mergers and economic concentration 
contributed to the negative perception of business amalgamations among 
the occupying Americans.215 As a result, Article 15 of the 1947 AML 
forbade all mergers between potential competitors.216 American 
negotiators were also able to include prohibitions on holding companies 
and strict limitations on stockholding by non-financial firms in the 
AML.217 It was hoped that these provisions would inhibit the restoration of 
the pre-war zaibatsu, a central goal of the economic reform program.218 As 
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was the case with anti-cartel legislation, power relationships in place when 
the law was drafted dictated that a largely American–imposed merger 
policy would prevail based on their aim of democratization of the 
economy.219 
Shortly thereafter, calls by the Japanese elite for the AML’s 
amendment and the prospect of a conflict on the Korean peninsula resulted 
in a changed policy environment. At the recommendation of the U.S. 
business community,220 occupation authorities approved slight 
amendments to the AML in 1949 to expedite Japan’s economic recovery. 
Most notably, constraints on mergers and cross-shareholding by non-
financial enterprises were relaxed.221 Policymakers believed that this 
change in legislation would encourage foreign investment and allow the 
government to divest stock it had acquired in the zaibatsu dissolution 
efforts, revitalizing the Japanese economy.222 However, it was this initial 
amendment in 1949 that allowed the reemergence of the pre-war cross-
shareholding and the emergence of the main bank system, as friendly 
firms purchased each other’s stock in the equity market.223 In contrast to 
non-financial firms, financial enterprises survived the Occupation 
dissolution program with their assets intact and were able to hold up to 
five percent of competitor’s stock.224 Given the AML’s prohibition of 
holding companies, banks in the emerging keiretsu groups replaced the 
holding companies at the core of these business groups as a next-best 
alternative. Ongoing efforts to rebuild shareholding alliances were 
accelerated by a rash of “greenmail” takeover attempts in the early 1950s, 
leading firms to further strengthen their shareholding defences as a 
result.225 
[C]ross-shareholding arrangements in the post-war era operated as 
tacit mutual pacts designed to insulate the management of both 
sides from any market threat of hostile takeover. The purpose of 
most cross-shareholding is to avoid rather than confer shareholder 
rights, so stable shareholding relationships function as a strategy of 
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corporate management to limit shareholder governance of the 
firm.226 
Rather than face shareholders’ discipline, majority shares of firms were 
held by the main bank, which monitored firm management and provided a 
guarantee against failures, both managerial and financial.227 However, new 
laws clearly at odds with the main bank system were passed during the late 
stages of the Occupation. In 1948 the Occupation authorities passed the 
Securities Exchange Law, and in 1950 the Japanese Commercial Code was 
revamped. Both actions reflected American notions of shareholder rights. 
It is instructive that both laws were significantly amended or circumvented 
following the end of the American occupation; indeed, Commercial Code 
reform had no effect on Japanese corporate practice for several decades 
following the War.228 The American corporate governance framework 
conflicted with local economic and social norms due to the potential for 
disruptive layoffs and restructuring under a more profit minded approach. 
Adaptation of this legislation to local norms allowed the main bank system 
to flourish. In summary, the changed power balance and resultant 
resurgence of local regulatory norms led to adaptation of the AML merger 
and stockholding policies, providing firms the means to defend against 
unwanted takeovers or amalgamations. 
Although this discussion has concentrated on domestic merger and 
acquisition policy, it is important to note that during this period, an 
international dimension of these policies surfaced. While mergers and 
acquisitions among Japanese firms posed threats to social stability, similar 
actions from foreign sources caused even greater apprehension among the 
Japanese elite. Consequently, in the later stages of the Occupation two 
laws were passed: the Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Law (1949), 
and the Foreign Investment Law (1950).229 These laws placed all foreign 
investment, including acquisitions, at the discretion of the bureaucracy. If 
government bureaus deemed a foreign bid undesirable, it was simply 
barred. For all intents and purposes, hostile bids from foreign sources were 
impossible.230  
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b. 1953–1970 
For the first twenty years of the post-war period, merger and 
acquisition activity in Japan was rather limited, especially prior to the mid-
1960s. “[I]t seems reasonably accurate to say that in Japan, first, mergers 
and acquisitions involving large firms are not many; second, hostile 
acquisitions are infrequent; and third, at least among large firms, looser 
forms of combination are preferred.”231 
As Table 3 shows, the number of mergers increased steadily over the 
period from 1950 to 1970. Yet, most of these mergers were among small-
scale enterprises. Acquisitions in Japan remained steady at nearly 200 per 
year between 1950 and 1964. They increased sharply to 300, and then to 
400 per year between 1965 and 1970.232 Compared to the merger and 
acquisition activity in the United States over a comparable period, there 
was far less activity in Japan.233 “Lest one conclude that these disparities 
simply reflect[ed] the oversized U.S. market for corporate control, data 
indicate that Japan’s M&A activity is extremely low by any international 
measure.”234 The question is: Why were there so few significant mergers 
and acquisitions in Japan between 1950 and 1970? 
TABLE 3: MERGERS IN JAPAN 1950–1970, BY COMBINED CAPITAL OF 
MERGED ENTITY235 
 number of mergers by size of merged entity (billions of ¥) 
Year Under 0.1 0.1—1 1 -10 Over 10 Total 
1950–1952 1,089 44 3 0 1,136 
1953–1955 919 71 17 0 1,007 
1956–1958 1,074 62 24 0 1,160 
1959–1961 1,272 140 33 3 1,448 
1962–1964 2,136 336 80 24 2,576 
1965–1967 2,386 290 69 15 2,760 
1968–1970 2,766 457 92 15 3,330 
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There were two principal reasons for this lack of large horizontal 
mergers and acquisitions. First, the motivation for these deals was not 
present, and second, their implementation was difficult. In a Western 
context, horizontal mergers are pursued in an effort to improve efficiency 
or to increase market power. As will be seen, neither of these merger 
incentives was particularly compelling in the Japanese economy of the 
1950s and 1960s. 
Potential efficiency gains are often a driving force behind horizontal 
mergers. Following a merger, such gains are often achieved through 
rationalization of the two workforces into one smaller and more efficient 
unit. In Japan, increased efficiency was extremely difficult to achieve 
through rationalization due to lifetime employment, rigid seniority 
systems, and strong firm-employee bonds.236 If a firm hoped to increase 
efficiency, it would do so by internal redistribution of its existing 
employees and resources, rather than through merger, since lifetime 
employment implies an increase in employees following a merger.237 
Furthermore, the necessity of adhering to existing seniority systems within 
firms following a merger would pose a complex puzzle that would likely 
result in conflict and inefficiencies. The bond between firms and their 
employees meant that any merger faced significant opposition from 
employees and management, and this opposition would harm the firm by 
exacerbating inefficiencies in addition to creating a negative social 
stigma.238 
The pursuit of market power provided little motivation for horizontal 
mergers due to the prevalence of horizontal agreements in the Japanese 
economy over the years in question (see Part C, supra). As a result of 
permissive regulation, horizontal agreements provided a more expedient 
method of gaining market power and circumvented any potential conflicts 
with labor norms. 
Beyond a lack of motivation, it was difficult for any large merger or 
acquisition to come to fruition due to the prevalence of the main bank 
system and the complex cross-shareholding arrangements that had 
developed among the keiretsu business (formerly zaibatsu) groups 
following the war. The 1953 amendment to the AML allowed 
stockholding by financial institutions to increase from five to ten percent 
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of a firm’s stock.239 This had two important impacts on the ability of firms 
to merge.  
First, it facilitated and legitimized the expansion of the main bank 
system. Banks were able to hold larger percentages of a firm’s stock as 
stable shareholders, dampening the market for corporate control.240 A 
potentially profitable merger that was not in the interest of the keiretsu 
(perhaps due to the necessity of guarding jobs or perhaps due to an 
aversion to amalgamation with entities outside the keiretsu) did not come 
to pass because the bank and other stable shareholders would simply block 
it. Despite the existence of the Commercial Code, a viable market for 
corporate control did not develop in Japan until at least the 1980s.241 
Second, the amendment increased cross-shareholding by friendly (non-
bank) shareholders further inhibiting any merger or acquisition. Part of the 
motivation behind this change in legislation was an increase in hostile 
takeover bids and greenmail in the wake of the Korean War, and Japan’s 
associated economic slowdown.242 Without other mechanisms of defense 
against unsolicited takeovers, due to underdeveloped legislation (Japanese 
law did not require disclosure of private shareholding interests until 1990), 
cross-stockholding between Japanese firms became widespread through 
the 1950s.243 As a result of the 1953 amendment, cross-shareholding 
increased between banks and firms, and amongst firms, thereby making 
unfriendly acquisitions even more difficult.244 
As noted earlier, mergers and acquisitions were both an opportunity 
and a threat to economic bureaucrats and the policymaking elite in Japan. 
Consequently, the Japanese government adapted merger policy such that it 
adhered to local norms through sponsorship of the main bank system.245 
Due to the “stable shareholders” within this corporate governance 
framework, firms could avoid mergers or acquisitions (even when they 
could be profitable) if doing so would endanger fulfillment of labor 
norms.246 The acute lack of a market for corporate control under the main 
bank system played a key role in protecting these norms.247 Also, 
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government encouragement of horizontal agreements (see Part C, supra) 
inadvertently removed a major motivation for horizontal mergers.  
Furthermore, the Japanese government provided regulatory support for 
cross-shareholding. A common extension of the cross-shareholding 
takeover defense was the offer of new shares to stable shareholders (at a 
discounted rate) in an attempt to thwart an unwanted suitor. Despite the 
fact that this practice contradicted the Commercial Code and impaired 
shareholder rights, Supreme Court decisions confirmed its legality until 
the late 1980s.248 Direct government encouragement of this practice came 
during the Yamaichi Crisis of 1963, when one of Japan’s larger securities 
firms was facing insolvency due to a precipitous fall in stock prices. 
Japanese policymakers felt particularly vulnerable during this crisis, as 
recent ascension to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) had meant greater openness of capital markets, 
increasing the potential for foreign hostile takeovers. In response, a 
government securities trust was set up by the Ministry of Finance to 
purchase shares and prevent a complete collapse of prices. The trust later 
proceeded to sell the shares to “group-linked companies and their banks,” 
which enhanced cross-shareholding and curbed unfriendly acquisitions.249  
It is important to recognize that minority and majority shareholding 
acquisitions were essentially unregulated.250 The AML (Articles 9.2 and 
10.1) states that stockholding must not hinder the workings of the 
competitive market.251 However, since the JFTC did not require any prior 
notification of stock purchases, it could not determine anti-competitive 
effects and, in essence, did not regulate them.252 Stock acquisitions went 
largely unchallenged by the JFTC,253 despite the potential for anti-
competitive effects.254 By not regulating these stockholding combinations, 
the government allowed firms to accommodate social norms within their 
business practices. 
Japan’s implementation of foreign rules governing merger policy 
resulted in a roundabout selective adaptation process, whereby associated 
rules and institutions (e.g., the main bank system, the structure of 
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shareholder rights, and stockholding regulations) were modified so that 
mergers and acquisitions would occur only when they conformed to local 
norms. 
In light of a lack of motivation, the existence of impediments, and 
antagonistic government regulatory behavior towards mergers and 
acquisitions, it can been argued that Japanese firms preferred to grow 
internally rather then use an external growth strategy based on mergers 
and acquisitions.255 If external growth was absolutely necessary, “looser 
combinations,” such as capital integration or partial acquisitions, 
prevailed, since these methods avoided contentious labor issues.256 
Despite the lack of large horizontal mergers, mergers were prevalent 
among smaller firms (see Table 3, supra). These small mergers were 
almost exclusively of a “rehabilitative” nature.257 If a firm was faced with 
insolvency (or other troubles), another firm within the same keiretsu 
business grouping would typically merge with or acquire that company.258 
Often, the acquiring firm already held a large portion of the failing 
company’s stock, meaning that an acquisition or merger was simply a 
deepening of a pre-existing relationship.259 In this way, firms were able to 
rationalize their operations within their business groupings and ease the 
pain felt in declining industries.260 Since small firms were involved, the 
human resource constraints mentioned above261 were more easily 
reconciled. Indeed, these types of purchases were welcomed by Japanese 
society, and were consistent with societal norms and avoided abrupt 
structural adjustment.262 
In the mid-1960s a small number of very large mergers occurred.263 
Although the JFTC was able to prevent some early anti-competitive 
mergers, such as the proposed paper merger of 1968, several mergers were 
approved that created conditions detrimental to competition, most notably 
the Yawata-Fuji Steel merger of 1969.264 Although there were some post-
merger divestitures, the reformed Nippon Steel held a nearly 100% market 
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share in several sectors.265 Apparently, a bargain between the JFTC and 
MITI allowed for some of these mergers to pass: MITI would stop trying 
to dismantle the AML and the JFTC would take a permissive attitude 
towards mergers.266 The JFTC seemed to take this agreement to heart as it 
rarely opposed large mergers or acquisitions prior to the 1990s.267 
Most of the large mergers in Japan’s history have occurred under heavy 
bureaucratic guidance.268 Prior to any merger or acquisition activity, the 
companies involved would pay a visit to the relevant ministries, which 
solidified bureaucratic control over mergers and acquisitions through 
informal consultations and recommendations.269 Formal decisions in these 
consultation cases were unusual prior to the 1990s (and records of 
informal consultations were not published), maximizing bureaucratic 
discretion in future cases.270 Also, government guidance aided firms in 
bypassing some of the potential obstacles to mergers mentioned above.  
Foreign merger and acquisition attempts faced nearly insurmountable 
bureaucratic obstacles through the 1970s, as foreign firms still had to 
contend with the provisions contained in the Foreign Exchange and Trade 
Control Law and the Foreign Investment Law, which both remained in 
place until the 1980s.271 
c. 1970–Present 
In 1971 a tender offer system was introduced. Although this was a step 
towards a competitive market for corporate control, hostile takeovers 
remained nearly impossible within this system because approvals were 
still at the discretion of the Ministry of Finance.272 The regulations served 
as a “structural impediment” to takeovers from 1971 until 1990, when they 
were amended.273 As a result, only three tender offers were initiated during 
these thirty years.274 Nevertheless, the mere introduction of this system 
signified a first step towards a more competitive, market-oriented merger 
policy.  
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In 1977 the AML was again amended, including changes to merger 
policy. The permitted stockholding ratio of financial institutions was 
reduced from ten percent of a firm’s stock back to five percent, although it 
took over ten years to implement this change.275 Public concern over 
inflation and the Oil Cartel scandal provided a policy environment 
conducive to pro-competitive policies, and it was hoped this new 
legislation would help combat the influence of large business groupings 
and banks over individual enterprises and consumers as a whole.276 At the 
very least, this reduction began to limit firms’ defenses against takeovers 
and to remove insulation against structural adjustment for the benefit of 
the competitive market. 
By the 1980s, the characteristics of mergers in Japan also began to 
change. Rather then simply indicating a “company in trouble,” mergers 
became a growth strategy for firms.277 A study of Japanese mergers and 
acquisitions in the 1980s suggests that they were usually a means towards 
“product and market extension.”278 As the complexion of mergers 
changed, government policy slowly adapted. Support for the main bank 
system and resistance to unsolicited takeovers gradually waned. The 
reduction of stockholding ratios put a constraint on this corporate 
governance system, while several policy changes altered the hostile 
takeover norm and associated shareholding practices. In 1980 the JFTC 
published merger guidelines, specifying market share levels (twenty-five 
percent for the new entity) at which mergers would likely be challenged in 
line with levels in other jurisdictions.279 A year later, the JFTC announced 
another set of guidelines, stipulating disclosure of private stockholding 
interests on both a yearly basis and following any acquisition, in order to 
establish whether “a joint relationship due to stockholding” existed.280 
While the threat of prosecution under the AML curtailed the practice of 
cross-shareholding, it was a Supreme Court decision condemning the issue 
of discounted shares for sale to friendly shareholders (to block takeovers) 
that constituted the major blow to cross-shareholding.281 
Following the onset of a recession in the early 1990s, the Japanese 
merger environment changed even further. 
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The interesting feature of the new wave of Japanese M&A during 
the 1990s is that the nature of M&As has changed in face of the 
current micro- and macroeconomic situation in Japan. The 
economic conditions facing many firms today have fostered a 
climate where M&As based on due diligence and future strategic 
advantage, rather than based on network affiliations, have become 
common. In addition, the resistance towards takeovers by 
competitors and especially foreign firms seeking a foothold in Japan 
through M&As has started to diminish. In other words, the changing 
pattern of Japanese M&As is mirrored on multiple levels, including 
purely economic considerations and perceptions among individuals 
in the organizations.282 
The steady increase of merger activity in Japan beginning in the early 
1990s can be attributed to economic stagnation and the institutional 
change it produced. The old economic system of stable shareholders and 
lifetime employment led Japan to a recession, and both economic actors 
and policymakers recognized the need for changes. Main banks could no 
longer play the role they had in the economy, and so began the 
disintegration of the cross-shareholding system. Firms faced with 
increasing losses and greater pressure from shareholders saw mergers and 
acquisitions as a route to revitalization. The Japanese government 
recognized the need to facilitate corporate reorganization with new 
legislation. In essence, these changes reflected the de-legitimization of 
previously ingrained economic norms, such as “cross-ownership, main 
bank system, and employee-centered corporate governance.”283 
For the purpose of understanding the onset of the merger boom, the 
first point to consider is the impact of the economic downturn on the main 
bank system, and by consequence on the cross-shareholding system. The 
main banks were adversely impacted by the stock market crash due to the 
large amounts of unprofitable investment readily offered to members of 
the banks’ corporate groups. This new economic reality meant that these 
banks were unable to play their accustomed role at the center of their 
business groups. Banks were forced to call in outstanding loans and 
decrease their cross-shareholding to avoid failure.284 As the cross-
shareholding system began to unwind, another impediment to mergers and 
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acquisitions was removed when several major Japanese banks merged in 
1998.285 These mergers confirmed the decline of the old system, as the 
new banks rapidly decreased their cross-shareholding commitments.286 
With the influx of foreign capital following the financial deregulation of 
the same year, the role of the main banks further faded, as did the 
government guarantee against bank failure implicit in the system.287 
It should be noted that foreign institutional investors purchased the vast 
majority of the stock sold by the main banks. These shareholders were 
very different from those of the previous stable shareholders, in that they 
demanded a reasonable rate of return on their investment.288 As losses 
mounted in conjunction with pressure from shareholders, firms found that 
corporate reorganization (through mergers and acquisitions) was an 
effective way of adapting to the demand for profits.  
Japanese policymakers understood that legislative changes were 
needed in light of economic stagnation. Beginning in 1997, the prohibition 
on holding companies was lifted from the AML to facilitate corporate 
reorganization.289 A year later, the “Big Bang” financial deregulation 
dramatically increased merger activity290 by introducing the reality of 
financial sector reform.291 Revision of corporate law began in earnest in 
1999, when the Commercial Code was changed to allow share-for-share 
swaps between firms for the first time, enabling reorganization through 
holding companies or “stock swap” mergers and acquisitions.292 In 2001, 
further amendments to commercial legislation permitted “corporate 
division,” enabling firms to better manage subsidiaries and joint 
ventures.293 Another revision was introduced in 2002 that provided firms 
with two options for the structure of their board of governors and their 
system of corporate governance.294 More recently, corporate law changes 
have allowed “triangular mergers” between Japanese and foreign firms. 
The new legislation allows foreign firms to acquire Japanese firms through 
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formation of a Japanese subsidiary, followed by a stock swap between the 
subsidiary and the target firm, whereby the Japanese subsidiary trades 
shares of the foreign parent company. However, implementation was 
delayed due to a series of hostile takeover attempts that worried 
policymakers and business people. In particular, the attempted hostile 
acquisition of Fuji TV by Livedoor (a Japanese firm backed by American 
capital) in 2005 struck the public consciousness and created widespread 
alarm over unsolicited foreign acquisitions.295 Nonetheless, the new 
triangular merger law came into effect in May 2007, forming part of 
Japan’s strategy for attracting foreign investment and promoting 
growth.296 
The increasing number of mergers through the 1990s prompted the 
JFTC to issue a series of merger guidelines. In 1998 the JFTC passed a 
new set of merger guidelines that introduced the factors regulators would 
consider when evaluating a merger.297 The guidelines added transparency 
to the process, but uncertainty still remained about how the JFTC would 
weigh the various factors in a decision.298 In this regard the 1998 
guidelines still preserved elements of the previous approach to merger 
regulation, which had thrived in a bureaucratic regulatory culture, and 
relied heavily on informal consultations between business and bureaucrats. 
The JFTC further revised the merger guidelines in 2004, increasing 
transparency by clarifying exactly how decisions will be reached based on 
gathered information and economic measures.299 These guidelines seem to 
greatly limit bureaucratic discretion and the practice of industrial policy 
through merger policy. 
The guidelines were revised again in March 2007.300 The process for 
defining the relevant market was sharpened, safe and unsafe harbors were 
stipulated in terms of concentration levels, the efficiency exemption was 
more clearly defined and thereby constrained, and the roles of foreign 
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competition and the condition of market entry in the evaluation were set 
out. Policy today, insofar as it is reflected in these guidelines, is strikingly 
similar to merger control in the United States. 
3. The Selective Adaptation of Merger Policy 
The development of merger policy within the context of a competition 
policy in Japan is markedly different from the evolution of anti-cartel 
policy. At war’s end, regulatory norms as reflected in bureaucratic 
guidance, viewed horizontal agreements positively. Foreign rules hostile 
to such agreements were perceived as misguided and illegitimate. 
Consequently, adoption of the foreign rules was resisted and adaptation in 
the early years was significant. Foreign rules hostile to horizontal mergers 
were not seen in the same light because local norms were also hostile to 
disruptive takeovers. In effect, there was little need for the authorities to 
deal with anti-competitive mergers because there were so few of them.  
Over time, policies that insulated firms from takeovers came into 
disrepute. Most importantly, the prolonged recession of the 1990s was 
blamed in part on crony capitalism, which was supported by the main bank 
system and extensive cross-shareholding. Public policies that protected 
firms from unwanted takeovers were reversed or moderated, opening the 
door to an upsurge in merger and acquisition activity. In effect the 
prevailing “anti-merger” rules were seen to be impairing economic 
performance. As was the case with horizontal agreements, change came 
because of a perceived lack of complementarity between two social goals, 
harmony (as manifested by an absence of disruptive mergers) and 
economic performance.  
Japan is only recently experiencing the type of merger activity seen in 
North America and Western Europe. It appears that policy makers have 
accepted the legitimacy of merger controls that focus on the protection of 
competition, as opposed to controls focused on the maintenance of the 
status quo.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
As global economic integration proceeds, developing and transitional 
economies are implementing Western style economic policies. Sometimes 
adoption of specific policies is the price of admission to a trade group or 
organization and is, in a sense, forced on the recipient. In other cases, the 
policies are willingly and voluntarily adopted as they are seen as a 
necessary condition for a well functioning market economy. In many 
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instances, regardless of whether adoption is voluntary or non-voluntary, 
the adopting country is unfamiliar with the liberal economic norms that 
underlie the policy. There can be conflict when foreign rules or polices are 
incompatible with local economic and social norms and practices. 
Identification of the causes of such conflicts is a step towards their 
resolution. 
Selective adaptation theory reasons that local norms will play a central 
role in the manner in which foreign ideas are integrated into the local 
context. Rather then blindly accepting foreign norms and practices (and 
the rules accompanying them), nations will adapt the foreign practices to 
serve local policy imperatives. Through this adaptation process, the 
dominant foreign practices are subject to modification by local norms. 
This modification and adaptation depends upon the local perspective of 
the foreign practice, the legitimacy of the foreign practice in the local 
context, and the extent to which the foreign practice complements local 
norms. Conflicts emerge when foreign and local perceptions as to the 
purpose and effects of the policy diverge, when local stakeholders view 
the policy as illegitimate, and when the foreign practice is seen to be at 
odds with local economic norms and goals. 
This Article has employed the selective adaptation framework to 
explain the development of Japan’s Antimonopoly Law. Application of 
that theory provides an evolutionary case study of a foreign policy that 
underwent adaptation according to local norms and priorities. Japan’s 
Antimonopoly Law was imposed by an occupying power, and the law was 
a reflection of that power’s economic and social values. American belief in 
freedom from concentrations of economic power and anti-statism were the 
basis for the installation of antitrust norms in the United States, and they 
were also at the core of the imposed Antimonopoly Law. When the law 
came into being, Japan’s sole concern was post-war recovery. Based on its 
pre-war experience with rapid development and bureaucratic guidance that 
relied upon cooperation, and sometimes outright cartelization among 
competing firms, it is unsurprising that Japanese policymakers looked to 
these methods to rebuild post-war Japan. For many Japanese the AML was 
perceived as illegitimate and inconsistent with extant regulatory norms and 
economic goals and thus, when the opportunity arose, Japan amended its 
competition laws to better reflect local norms and priorities. In effect, 
adaptation (of both the law and the enforcement process) was such that 
Japan had no real competition policy for thirty years following passage of 
the AML. This adaptation process only began to change direction during 
the period of high inflation in the late 1970s when the need for stronger 
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competition policy became apparent. It was not until the onset of recession 
in the 1990s that the policy was made truly effective. 
Based upon this review of the evolution of Japan’s competition policy, 
it is our view that the selective adaptation model shows considerable 
promise as a tool to explain the speed of adoption and the extent of 
adaptation of foreign regulatory norms in local environments.  
From the perspective of capacity building, it seems to us that the power 
relationship between the source of the foreign regulatory norms and the 
recipient, while important, is not the overriding consideration. Similarly, 
the written rule and the structure of the enforcement agency are important 
but not paramount. The critical factors are perception, legitimacy, and 
complementarity. The acceptance of the regulatory norms underlying an 
effective competition policy can require a wholesale change in business 
and regulatory cultures, and this does not happen quickly. 
[The] “Harmonization culture” that dominated Japanese business 
thinking need[s] to experience culture shock in order to concede to 
the new one, “competition culture.” Needless to say, any culture 
requires a long time to change, and [the] Japanese business 
community is in the midst of such cultural changes.301 
The lesson from the Japanese experience is that capacity builders 
should focus on perception, legitimacy, and complementarity issues. Of 
these, complementarity is the key. In Japan it was only when stakeholders 
became convinced that competitive markets would deliver economic 
prosperity that competition policy became effective.  
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